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Abstract 
 
This review present some evidence on fraud, forensic accounting, the skills and education of the forensic investigator. Also, some 
explanation for the diverging views among academics and regulators in relation to detecting fraud are provided. To regulators, I ad-
dress the question on why academic research in forensic accounting have little significance to inform policy. Further, I present some 
rich set of questions and identify a number of important directions for future research in forensic accounting. This paper is intended 
to stimulate debates and future research of the issues identified. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper reviews the literature on fraud and forensic accounting. 
For the purpose of this review, forensic accounting involves the 
process of understanding, identifying, detecting and communi-
cating fraud patterns and schemes to stakeholders to aid any inves-
tigation process or activity. Accounting standards allow managers 
to exercise discretion in financial reporting. However, there are 
concerns that managerial discretion can be abused and could be 
used to engage in, and to hide fraudulent practices. Hence, the 
need for forensic accounting. Nonetheless, the quality of any fo-
rensic activity would require the fraud expert or investigator to be 
knowledgeable on how perpetrators engage in fraud, how it mani-
fests, how it is disguised and how to detect fraud. Motivated by 
this concern, this review examines prior studies on forensic ac-
counting and draw implications for academic research and for 
policy. 
 
Forensic accounting academics emphasize the need for forensic 
accounting education. However, little is known about whether 
forensic accounting education has unintended consequences. The 
literature is quiet on this issue. Thus, this review discusses this 
concern as a gap in the recent literature. Further, this review ad-
dresses a thought-provoking issue on whether all fraud cases 
should be given equal investigative priority. Just as medical doc-
tors do not consider all illness to be life-threatening and, therefore, 
do not commit significant resources (or the same amount of re-
sources) to each category of illness. Similarly, using this analogy, 
it is easy to understand why regulators react differently to several 
reported fraud cases. Finally, this review makes a contribution to 
the forensic accounting literature. 
 
This review is structured as follows. Section 2 and 3 discuss fraud 
and forensic accounting. Section 4 reviews the literature on the 
skills and education of the forensic investigator. Section 5 discuss-
es some practical and policy issues. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Fraud 
2.1. Define Fraud 
‘Financial statement fraud is a deliberate attempt by corporations 
to deceive or mislead users of published financial statements, es-
pecially investors and creditors, by preparing and disseminating 
materially misstated financial statements’ (Rezaee, 2005: 279). An 
extensive literature on fraud exists (e.g. Apostolou et al, 2000; 
Rezaee, 2005; Ozkul and Pamukcu, 2012, etc.). Jointly, the litera-
ture show some consensus that  fraud may involve: (1) the altera-
tion or manipulation of material financial records, supporting doc-
uments, or business transactions; (2) intentional misstatements, 
omissions, or misrepresentation of events, transactions, accounts 
or other significant information from which financial statements 
are prepared; (3) deliberate misapplication and misinterpretation 
of accounting standards, principles, policies and methods used to 
measure, recognize, and report economic events and business 
transactions; (4) intentional omissions and disclosures or presenta-
tion (5) the use of aggressive accounting techniques such as ille-
gitimate earnings management strategies; and (6) the manipulation 
of accounting practices under rule-based or principle-based ac-
counting standards that allow companies to hide the economic 
substance of their performance. 
 
Fraud schemes vary in scope, context and with the position of the 
perpetrators within the firm. Some types of fraud are specific to 
some industries due to industry-related incentives (e.g. Calavita et 
al, 1997). For example, securities and investment fraud is common 
to the banking and financial services industry. Other types of fraud 
are concentrated within top and middle management levels (e.g. 
Crumbley, 2003; Zahra et al, 2005; etc.).Other type of fraud com-
mitted by employees include: creating fictitious expenses and 
obtaining disbursements, creating ghost employees and receiving 
their wages or salary, creating ghost suppliers and receiving their 
payments, benefiting from overstated personal expenditure, etc., 
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(Ozkul and Pamukc, 2012). Fraud involving accounting numbers 
often manifest by directing manipulating accounting numbers used 
to generate financial reports, for example, inventory overvaluation 
and improper capitalization of capital expense (e.g. Harris & 
Brown, 2000; Messmer, 2004), earnings management (e.g. Healy 
and Wahlen, 1999), income smoothing (Ahmed et al, 1999; Curcio 
and Hasan, 2013; Ozili, 2015, etc.) 
2.2. Fraud Motivations 
2.2.1. The Fraud Triangle 
Compensation Incentives/Pressure 
 
Personal needs, social needs, economic needs and the need to meet 
compensation-based targets provide some incentive to commit 
fraud. There is evidence that the use of incentive systems increas-
es the likelihood to commit fraud among managers. For example, 
Johnson et al. (2003) found that compensation pressures, and in-
centives are significantly associated with firms that have a fraud 
history. Similar evidence was documented by Denis et al. (2005). 
Hernandez and Groot (2007) find some association between the 
use of incentive systems and fraud risk. Specifically, they exam-
ined auditors’ perspective on incentives that increase the likeli-
hood to commit fraud. They identified senior management unethi-
cal attitudes, use of incentive systems and dishonest communica-
tions as important indicators of the likelihood to commit fraud or 
fraud risk. Efendi et al. (2007) found that the likelihood of misstat-
ing financial statement increases when the CEO has a sizable 
amount of stock options and when firms are constrained by debt 
covenants. Other evidence for incentive-related fraud include: Lie 
(2005) and Burns and Kedia (2006). In contrast, Erickson et al. 
(2000) examined the association between equity incentives and 
financial statement fraud. After examining firms that were accused 
of fraud during the 1996-2003 period, they found no association 
between equity incentives and accounting fraud. These conflicting 
results seem to suggest that not all type of compensation system 
motivate managers to commit fraud. Therefore, there is a need for 
future research to identify specific incentives that motivate man-
agers to engage in fraud and those incentives that de-motivate 
managers to commit fraud. 
 
Opportunities 
 
When the incentive to commit fraud exists, the perpetuator will 
seek an ‘opportunity’ to perform the fraudulent act. There is a 
consensus in the literature that the opportunity to commit fraud is 
more likely when there are ineffective monitoring and control 
systems (e.g. Beasley, 1996; Albrecht and Albrecht, 2003; etc.), 
particularly, when there are fewer independent board members 
(e.g. Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al. 1996; McMullen and 
Raghunandan, 1996;  Farber, 2005), fewer audit committee meet-
ings and fewer financial experts on the audit committee (e.g. Ab-
bott et al.2004; Farber, 2005; etc.). Beasley (1996) finds that the 
proportion of independent members on the board of directors is 
lower for firms that engage in fraud practices relative to non-fraud 
firms. Evidence from these studies suggests that lesser monitoring 
creates opportunities for fraud to be committed. 
 
Rationalizations 
 
Rationalization is the third component of the fraud triangle. When 
fraud perpetrators have some incentive and find an opportunity to 
commit fraud, the perpetrator will seek explanations to justify 
their actions. Some justification includes claiming that: ‘I bor-
rowed the money’; ‘I would pay back’, ‘nobody has suffered as a 
result of this’, ‘I didn’t know it was a crime’, etc. (refer to: Ozkul 
and Pamukcu, 2012; 24). 
 
Overall, in the literature there is a consensus that there are some 
relation between incentives, opportunities, and rationalization. 
Nonetheless, there is no agreement on the order or sequence of 
occurrence for each component of the fraud triangle. Therefore, 
future research should attempt to establish a systematic and logical 
sequence between incentives, opportunities, rationalization and 
capabilities while at the same permitting inter-dependence among 
each component of the fraud triangle. 
2.2.2. Fraud Polygon 
Several studies have made attempts to expand the fraud triangle. 
Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) expanded the fraud triangle by add-
ing a fourth dimension to the triangle which they termed the ‘fraud 
diamond’. The fourth dimension is ‘capability’. According to 
Wolfe and Hermanson (2004), ‘capability’ addresses the reality 
that some people will not commit fraud even if all three original 
factors are strongly present. The perpetrator must have the capa-
bility to commit the fraudulent act with some confidence that it 
will go undetected. Also, Rezaee (2005) present an alternative to 
the fraud triangle as an attempt to identify potential causes of 
fraud. Rezaee (2005) investigated factors that may increase the 
likelihood of committing fraud by equating fraud tendencies to a 
concept he termed – CRIME where “C” stands for Cooking the 
books, “R” for Recipes, “I” for Incentives, “M” for Monitoring or 
lack of it, and “E” for End Results. Rezaee (2005) concluded, 
based on his CRIME analysis, that financial statement fraud is a 
serious threat to investors’ confidence in financial information. 
More recently, Kranacher et al (2010) formulated their “MICE” 
approach to explain the motivation (fraud) to commit fraud. Ac-
cording to Kranacher et al (2010), MICE - Money, Ideology, Co-
ercion, and Ego/Entitlement are motivations to commit fraud. In 
their analysis, they maintained the structure of the fraud triangle 
but used a co-joined triangle similar to the fraud diamond. 
 
Following prior studies, there are prospects that future academic 
research and emerging sophisticated fraud cases in the near future 
would improve our understanding of fraud and, thus, expand the 
fraud triangle and fraud diamond further. This new dimension is 
the fraud polygon. The idea behind the fraud polygon is to estab-
lish a systematic and logical sequence among newly emerging 
motivations to commit fraud while at the same permitting inter-
dependence among each motivation. 
3. Forensic Accounting Perspectives 
Bolgna and Linquist (1995) defined forensic accounting as the 
application of financial skills and investigative mentality to unre-
solved issues, conducted within the context of the rules of evi-
dence.  Forensic accounting involves the application of accounting 
and auditing, financial and investigative skills, to unsettled issues, 
conducted within the context of the rules of evidence (see. Aroki-
asamy and Cristal-Lee, 2009; Ozkul and Pamukc, 2012). Follow-
ing this definition, the focus of forensic accounting is to identify 
and review fraudulent transactions to identify the real intent of the 
perpetrator. Such review may take the form of document reviews, 
interviews, examination of electronic documents, etc. 
 
From an auditor’s  perspective, forensic accounting deals with the 
application of auditing methods, techniques or procedures to re-
solve legal issues that require the integration of investigative, ac-
counting, and auditing skills (Arokiasamy and Cristal-Lee, 2009; 
Dhar and Sarkar, 2010). From the perspective of an attorney or a 
litigator, forensic accounting involves gathering, interpreting, 
summarizing and presenting complex financial issues in a clear, 
succinct and factual manner often in a court of law as an expert 
(Howard and Sheetz, 2006; Stanbury and Paley-Menzies, 2010). 
Such forensic evidence must meet standards required by courts of 
law and be presented in a manner that will be accepted by a court 
of jurisprudence.  
 
From the perspective of a fraud examiner, forensic accounting is 
the application of investigative and analytical skills to resolve 
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financial issues in a manner that meets standards required by 
courts of law (Hopwood et al, 2008). Overall, forensic accounting 
investigation will involve the services of the informed auditor, 
attorney and fraud examiner. 
4. Skills and Education of the Forensic Inves-
tigator 
4.1. Skills 
In this section, I classify the skills of the forensic investigator into 
two categories: core skills and enhanced skills. This categorization 
is similar to Davis et al. (2010)’s classification. 
 
 Core Skills: 
Core skills are skills considered to be fundamental to become a 
forensic investigator. For example, Messmer (2004) identified 
strong  
analytical abilities, written and verbal communication skills, crea-
tive mind-set and business acumen. Durkin and Ueltzen (2009) 
stress that the forensic investigator should possess the knowledge 
of (i) professional responsibilities and practice management; (ii)  
laws, courts and dispute resolution; (iii) planning and preparation; 
(iv) information gathering and preservation such as documents, 
interviews/phone calls, interrogations, electronic data, etc., and (v) 
discovery (reporting, experts and testimony). 
 
Davis et al (2010) undertook a survey involving 779 respondents 
from forensic professionals and fraud examiners to identify core 
skills of a forensic accountant or investigator. Their result was 
divided into three categories: core skills for forensic academics, 
practitioners (CPAs) and attorneys; enhanced skills and profes-
sional skills. According to Davis et al (2010), the top five core 
skills for the academics include: critical and strategic thinking, 
auditing skills, investigative ability, synthesis of results and think-
ing like the wrong-doer, etc., while the top five skills for the prac-
titioner (e.g. a CPA) include: critical and strategic thinking; effec-
tive written communication; effective oral communication; and 
investigative intuitiveness. 
 
 
 
 
Top  
10 
Core Skill of the Forensic 
academic 
Top Ranked 
Response 
Core Skill of the Forensic 
Practitoner 
Top 
Ranked 
Response 
Core Skill of the Attorney 
Top 
Ranked 
Response 
Ist Critical/strategic thinker 1 (62%) Critical/strategic thinker 1 (50%) Effective oral communicator 1 (61%) 
2nd Auditing skills 2 (53%) 
Effective written communica-
tor 
2 (43%) Simplify the information 2 (57%) 
3rd Investigative ability 3 (45)% Effective oral communicator 3 (43%) Critical/ strategic thinker 3 (49%) 
4th 
Synthesize results of discovery 
and analysis 
4 (43%) Investigative ability 4 (41%) Identify key issues 4 (38%) 
5th Think like the wrongdoer 5 (38%) Investigative intuitiveness 5 (39%) Auditing skills 5 (37%) 
6th Investigative intuitiveness 6 (36) 
Synthesize results of discovery 
and analysis 
6 (36%) Investigative ability 5 (37%) 
7th 
Effective written communica-
tor 
7 (34%) 
Organize an unstructured 
situation 
7 (34%) 
Synthesize results of discov-
ery and analysis 
5 (37%) 
8th 
Organize an unstructured 
situation 
8 (32%) Identify key issues 8 (32%) 
Understand the goals of a 
case 
8 (33%) 
9th Identify key issues 9 (30%) Auditing skills 9 (31%) Tell the story 9 (30%) 
10th Solve unstructured problems 9 (30%) Solve unstructured problems 9 (31%) See the big picture 9 (30%) 
 Adapted from Davis et al (2010): p. 10. 
 
 Enhanced skills: 
Enhanced skills are skills developed through years of experience 
in the profession in academia or industry. Grippo and Ibex (2003) 
argue that the most important skills of forensic accountants come 
from experience in accounting, auditing, taxation, business opera-
tions, management, internal controls, interpersonal relationships, 
and communication. Ramaswamy (2005) suggests skills such as: 
in-depth knowledge of financial statements, the ability to critically 
analyse them and a thorough understanding of fraud schemes. 
Other studies such as Curtis (2008) and Digabriele (2008) observe 
that academics and practitioners agree on the importance of a 
working knowledge of the legal process and criminology as an 
enhanced skill. 
 
In Davis et al (2010), the top enhanced skills for the forensic aca-
demic, practitioner and attorney, include: fraud detection, inter-
viewing skills, analysis and interpretation of financial statements, 
electronic discovery, general knowledge of rules of evidence and 
civil procedure and information, testifying, knowledge of relevant 
professional standards, etc. As shown in table, the relative im-
portance of enhanced skills for each industry practice (academia 
and practice) differs according to the need of the practice. 
 
 
 
Enhanced Skills 
Top 
5 
Skill of the Forensic  
Academic 
Top Ranked  
Response 
 Skill of the Forensic  
Practitioner 
Top 
Ranked 
Response 
Core Skill of the Attorney 
Top 
Ranked 
Response 
Ist Fraud detection 1 (79%) 
Analyze and interpret finan-
cial statements 
and information 
1 (79%) 
Analyze and interpret finan-
cial statements 
and information 
1 (91%) 
2nd Interviewing skills 2 (70%) Interviewing skills 2 (63%) Testifying 2 (74%) 
3rd 
Analyze and interpret finan-
cial statements 
and information 
3 (64)% Fraud detection 3 (56%) 
Knowledge of relevant pro-
fessional 
standards 
3 (70%) 
4th Electronic discovery 4 (43%) Testifying 4 (49%) Audit evidence 4 (53%) 
5th 
General knowledge of rules 
of evidence 
and civil procedure 
4 (43%) 
General knowledge of rules 
of evidence 
and civil procedure 
4 (39%) Fraud detection 4 (53%) 
Adapted from Davis et a (2010): p. 10. 
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4.2. Education 
Prior studies show evidence that forensic accounting practice ap-
pears to be gaining importance within academic institutions (e.g. 
Rezaee et al. 1996; Rezaee and Burton, 1997; Peterson and Reider, 
1999, 2001; Rezaee, 2002; Crumbley et al, 2003). The study of 
forensic accounting, as a branch of accounting, requires broad 
multi-disciplinary knowledge, particularly, in the knowledge of 
business activities, human behaviour (psychology), working 
knowledge of the legal system, etc. There appear to be some con-
sensus on the broad nature of forensic accounting (e.g. Enofe et al. 
2013). A broad focus to forensic accounting among tertiary insti-
tutions has some benefits to educational stakeholders. Specifically, 
Buckhoff and Schrader (2000) argue that incorporating forensic 
accounting as a course of study in the accounting curriculum bene-
fits three major stakeholders in accounting education-academic 
institutions, students and employers of accounting graduates. In a 
survey on the importance of forensic accounting among tertiary 
institutions, Peterson and Reider (2001) report that accounting 
instructors in universities acknowledge the importance of forensic 
accounting. 
 
Other studies examine the extent to which forensic-related courses 
are taught in the accounting curricula among tertiary institutions. 
Groomer and Heinz (1994) investigated whether forensic related 
topics were taught in universities. They found evidence that fraud-
related topics were taught in internal auditing courses.  Rezaee et 
al. (1996) found that few universities offer a course in fraud or 
forensic accounting. Buckhoff and Schrader (2000) examined the 
extent of forensic accounting education in the US and found that 
US universities considered forensic accounting to be moderately 
important for inclusion in the accounting curriculum. 
 
In contrast, some studies document diverging views on whether 
forensic accounting courses should be incorporated into the aca-
demic curricula. Rezaee and Burtin (1997) found that forensic 
accountants prefer to have forensic accounting as a stand-alone 
course while academics prefer to integrate forensic accounting 
into existing accounting courses. Rezaee et al. (1996) report some 
disagreements among practitioners and academics on the topical 
content of the forensic accounting curriculum. To date, the topical 
content of forensic accounting in the accounting curriculum is 
highly debated and remains a fruitful area for future research. 
4.3. Implication 
Although there appear to be a weak consensus on the skill-set of 
the forensic investigator, the importance of each skill at a particu-
lar time or fraud event will depend on the type of fraud event and 
the depth of investigation required. The broad range of skills of 
the forensic investigator identified in the literature has conse-
quences of further broadening the scope of forensic accounting 
education among tertiary institutions. First, it leads to questions on 
whether forensic accounting students should cover a wide range of 
topics in auditing, financial analysis, psychology, criminology, 
legal and other topics. Second, a broad focus to forensic account-
ing education implies that in-depth forensic education is unlikely 
to be adequately covered during the yearly or termly syllabus 
within academic institutions either as a stand-alone course or as an 
integrated course. Thus, there is a need to define the core content 
of forensic accounting to be taught in educational institutions and 
professional institutions. The argument that, academic institutions 
should focus on core auditing and financial reporting content of 
forensic accounting education while professional institutions 
should focus on the legal and investigative content of forensic 
education, is highly critical because it is difficult to distinguish 
between core and non-core areas of forensic accounting. Also, it 
raises more questions such as: what topics should be included and 
excluded from the accounting curriculum? These issues remain a 
fruitful area of future research. 
Further, there are concerns that teaching the younger generation 
the techniques to detect fraud may not necessarily deter them from 
fraud but could teach them how to commit fraud without leaving 
traces, thus, leading to unintended consequences. I argue that in-
creased education on fraud and forensic accounting among tertiary 
institutions could witness the emergence of a new breed of orga-
nized fraud perpetrators that do not leave traces of fraud because 
they know how to clean up the traces of fraud through their 
knowledge of fraud detection strategies taught in the university. 
The difficulty that regulators or forensic expert face is to deal with 
fraudster that do not leave fraud traces. To avoid this unintended 
consequence, a balance is needed between teaching students to 
detect fraud and how to de-motivate them from engaging in fraud-
ulent practices. In response to this, it is tempting to advocate for 
the case that the skills of fraud detection should only be taught to 
fraud investigators, potential forensic analyst and external auditors 
at professional institutions rather than equipping university stu-
dents with skills of fraud detection. Future research can be relied 
upon to find ways to balance the need to educate the younger gen-
eration on fraud detect strategies while at the same time ensuring 
that forensic education at universities do not motivate students to 
engage in fraud, thus, minimising the unintended consequences of 
forensic education. 
5. Practical Issues: Research and Policy 
5.1. Detecting Fraud: Academics vs Regulators 
Academic studies attempt to formulate several checklists, red-
flags or ‘boxes to tick’ as possible indicators of fraud. Hogan et al 
(2008) presents a literature review on this. The presence of one or 
more fraud symptom is often perceived as evidence or signals 
indicating fraud, particularly, when supported with evidence from 
sophisticated statistical models such as logistic regression, data 
mining techniques. While academic research continue to maintain 
the symptom-based empirical (statistical) approach to detect fraud, 
regulators, on the other hand, do not necessarily maintain this 
view. 
Unlike academics, regulators (investigators) agree that there may 
be some relationship not, necessarily, a ‘strong’ or ‘logical’ rela-
tionship between fraud symptoms and actual fraud. For this reason, 
regulators match reported fraud symptoms with supplementary 
evidence beyond statistical reports to detect whether there is evi-
dence of actual fraud. Such supplementary evidence may include 
interrogations, expert witness, interviews, etc. 
5.2. Fraud: 2 + 2 Do Not Always Equal 4 
In fraud detection, 2 + 2 do not always equal 4 every time, at least 
from a regulator’s perspective. This means that the presence of 
fraud symptoms does not necessarily imply that there is actual 
fraud. The literature highlights some symptoms of fraud, for ex-
ample,   Albrecht and Albrecht (2003) identified: internal control 
weaknesses, analytical anomalies, extravagant lifestyles, unusual 
behaviours, etc. While there appear to be some consensus that 
statistical models significantly improves the fraud detection pro-
cess, it is arguable that statistical-based fraud symptoms always 
lead to real fraud cases. In reality, it is unlikely that fraud symp-
toms indicates evidence of actual fraud. 
 
Let’s take extravagant lifestyle as an example. Individuals who 
have a personal history of living extravagantly tend to maintain 
that kind of lifestyle when they find themselves in top manage-
ment. In this case, the existence of fraud may not be associated 
with extravagant lifestyle. Only few studies raise this concern that 
fraud symptoms do not often lead to actual fraud cases (e.g. Al-
brecht and Romney, 1986; Hogan et al, 2008). Notably, Albrecht 
and Romney (1986) investigated some fraud symptom and ob-
served that such investigation did not produce evidence of fraud. 
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5.3. Cost-Benefit Analysis of Fraud Investigation 
Investigation into every reported fraud case is costly to regulators 
(investigators). For this reason, it is unlikely that all reported fraud 
cases will receive full (and equal) investigative priority. Also, if 
each case is considered for investigation, significant resources will 
not be channelled proportionately to all fraud cases. There are 
good reasons for this. First, investigating potential fraud cases 
involve committing significant amount of resources into the inves-
tigation with the aim to detect actual fraud. This activity is reward-
ing to investigators if the investigation leads to the identification 
of actual fraud. In this case, the perpetrators (firms) would be 
penalized and fined which allows regulators (investigators) to 
recover significant resources (monetary equivalent) committed 
into the investigation. On the other hand, when investigation does 
not lead to identifying real fraud cases, significant amount of in-
vestigators’ resource is lost. This loss of resources committed to 
investigation affect the way regulators respond to fraud cases or 
events. The cost associated with fraud investigation deters regula-
tors from giving every reported fraud case equal investigative 
priority. On the other hand, academics stress that each reported 
fraud case should be taken seriously. This is unlikely to be the 
case in reality in reality because just as medical doctors do not 
consider all illnesses to be life-threatening and thus do not commit 
significant resources to this category of illness, it is easy to under-
stand why regulators react differently to some reported fraud cases.  
Therefore, the cost and benefit of fraud investigation provides 
another explanation for the diverging views between an academic 
and policy maker. 
5.4. Research and Policy Gap: why forensic accounting 
research does not inform policy  
Forensic accounting research should play an important role to 
inform practice (audit) and policy. The future of forensic account-
ing research will depend on its ability to inform policy. However, 
forensic academic research has done little to inform policy and 
supervisory rules for the following reasons. 
1) Empirical studies, predominantly, focus on investigating firms 
that have a fraud history in the past. The knowledge that firms 
committed fraud tend to drive a potential researcher to employ 
several statistical tests to support his expectation for the exist-
ence of fraud in his analysis. This practice in forensic research 
is not particularly useful to regulators. Regulators, on the other 
hand, are interested in detecting on-going fraudulent activities 
in firms while academic research focuses on past fraud events. 
Academic research will inform policy if forensic accounting 
research shifts their focus from firms with previous fraud his-
tory to firms that have no fraud history.  
2) Given recent advances in the knowledge of human behaviour 
and financial engineering, regulators understand that statistical 
methods used to detect past fraud events do not always con-
tribute significant explanatory power to detect future fraud 
cases, particularly, when investigation fraud cases require the 
use of different statistical-detection methods. 
5.5. A Policy Note 
To inform policy, another classification of fraud that might appeal 
to regulators and practitioners is needed. The rationale for this 
classification is that while regulators oppose fraud, not all fraud 
cases, in practice, require severe regulatory sanction or discipline. 
This is because investigating fraudulent misbehaviours imposes 
significant costs and other resources. I propose that a classification 
of fraud based on (i) the magnitude of misrepresented transactions; 
(ii) the materiality of the accounting number involved; (iii) the 
extent of its deceptive intent, and the (iv) the hierarchical status of 
the perpetrator - individual or firm; and (v) whether such practices 
are acceptable within the acceptable industry standards, should 
determine the investigative priority given to each reported fraud 
case. Accordingly, I classify fraud into ‘soft fraud’ and ‘hard 
fraud’. Soft fraud may be defined as any fraudulent practice by a 
firm that is considered to be legitimate by industry standards and 
practice (or regulatory rules) but is perceived as illegitimate out-
side the context of the industry. This kind of fraudulent practices 
includes, but not limited to, accrual expense and revenue manipu-
lations, earnings management. On the other hand, hard fraud is 
any fraudulent practice by a firm that is considered to be illegiti-
mate within and outside the context of the industry.  This kind of 
fraudulent practices includes, but not limited to, creating fictitious 
debtors, suppliers, etc. This type of fraud requires strict regulatory 
disciplinary actions. 
6. Conclusion 
In this review, we have examined several issues: the nature of 
fraud, forensic accounting, core and enhanced skills of the foren-
sic investigators as well as issues with forensic education. This 
review discussed some practical and policy issues. In conclusion, 
it is important to note that while forensic accounting is gaining 
significant research interests among academics, progress in foren-
sic accounting research will continue will depend on the extent to 
which fraud perpetrators leave traces. This is because fraud perpe-
trators do leave traces after performing the act. However, in the 
coming years, regulators will be more concerned about fraud per-
petrators who do not leave any trace of some sort. This will pose a 
problem for regulators if perpetrators have thorough knowledge of 
accounting standards, auditing techniques and investigative skills. 
This knowledge will help perpetrators to eliminate a possible trace 
of fraud. This will remain a supervisory and policy issue in the 
coming years. Finally, the progress in the forensic accounting 
literature will also depend on the extent to which forensic account-
ing informs practice and policy. 
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